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Abstract
We evaluate the impact of technology adoption subsidies on in-
vestment behavior in an individual choice experiment. In a laboratory
setting professional managers are confronted with an intertemporal de-
cision problem in which they have to decide whether or not to search
for, and possibly adopt, a new technology. Technologies di⁄er in the
per-period bene￿ts they yield, and their purchase price increases with
the per-period bene￿ts provided. We introduce a subsidy on the more
expensive technologies (that also yield the larger per-period bene￿ts),
and ￿nd that the subsidy scheme induces agents to search for and adopt
these more expensive technologies even though the subsidy itself is too
small to render these technologies pro￿table. We speculate that the
result is driven by the positive connotation (a⁄ect) that the concept
￿ subsidy￿invokes.
Keywords: framed ￿eld experiment, search model, technology sub-
sidies; JEL classi￿cation: C9, D8, H2.
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In many OECD countries, ￿rms and households can collect government sub-
sidies if they adopt certain technologies or appliances with socially desirable
characteristics. Many technologies and appliances provide not only bene￿ts
to the owner, but also to society at large. This certainly holds for envi-
ronmentally friendly technologies such as double glazing, insulation, high￿
e¢ ciency diesel engines, etc. These technologies have in common that they
reduce the owner￿ s energy bill, but they also mitigate the emissions of en-
vironmentally hazardous pollutants such as greenhouse gases and sulphur
dioxide. If the private investment costs associated with such technologies
are larger than their private bene￿ts but smaller than the social bene￿ts,
adoption is socially desirable but not privately optimal. To stimulate adop-
tion of such socially desirable technologies governments may decide to o⁄er
subsidies. Examples of environmental subsidy programs include the US En-
ergy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 109￿ 58￿ Aug. 8 2005) which envisages
spending $12.3 billion over the period 2005￿ 2015 on a⁄ecting investment
behavior of both households and ￿rms, and the Netherlands￿Energy In-
vestment Credit (EIA) program that provides subsidies targeted at small
and medium￿ sized ￿rms, with a budget of close to 1% of total government
spending in the Netherlands.
Notwithstanding their widespread use, the e⁄ectiveness of subsidies has
been subject to debate, among politicians and scientists alike.1 To date,
there are relatively few empirical studies that can inform this debate, and
the available evidence is mixed. The most widely studied subsidy program is
the Demand Side Management (DSM) program for households, implemented
by electric utilities in the US in the 1990s. According to some studies (for
example Walsh, 1989, Joskow and Maron, 1992, Malm, 1996) the program
was ine⁄ective in stimulating adoption of energy￿ saving appliances since a
large fraction of the households that did install an energy￿ e¢ cient appliance
would have done so anyway, but this conclusion was challenged by other
studies (e.g., Hassett and Metcalf, 1995, and Revelt and Train, 1998).
The most important reason why this debate is still unsettled is because
of the lack of a counterfactual. Each speci￿c technology￿ s net private ben-
1See International Energy Agency (2005) for an overview of the various arguments in
this discussion.
1e￿ts tend to di⁄er from ￿rm to ￿rm and from household to household (see
for example DeCanio and Watkins, 1998). To determine whether subsidies
really a⁄ect investment behavior, the researcher would like to know what
technology each individual ￿rm would adopt both if subsidies were available,
and if they were absent. Such data do not exist for obvious reasons, and
there are also hardly any natural experiments available that can shed light
on the investment behavior of (speci￿c types of) ￿rms. Subsidies are either
available to all ￿rms in a speci￿c industry, or to none. The introduction of
a subsidy scheme does not provide a fully reliable comparative static either
since economic circumstances (business cycle, interest rates, etc) are often
diferent in the time periods before and after the introduction. Indeed, the
ceteris paribus condition is essential in these types of studies because of the
importance of ￿rm characteristics and economic circumstances in determin-
ing investment behavior.
In this paper we aim to shed light on the impact of subsidies on adop-
tion behavior by means of a so￿ called framed ￿eld experiment (Harrison and
List, 2004). We construct an individual choice experiment in which subjects
can search for and possibly adopt technologies that yield ￿ ows of bene￿ts
in each period that the experiment lasts, where there is fundamental un-
certainty about the number of periods these technologies last, and where
searching is costly as it diverts away the decision maker￿ s attention from
other decisions that need to be made within a ￿rm (for example regarding
output, marketing etc.). By imposing this structure on the experiment we
try to mimic ￿ at least to some extent￿the circumstances under which de-
cision makers within ￿rms tend to make the investment choices. Another
important special feature of our experiment is that we employ managers of
small￿and medium￿ sized ￿rms who are experienced in making investment
decisions (subsidized or otherwise), either as employees or as self￿ employed
entrepreneurs, rather than a standard student subject pool.2 Because of the
tight control about the circumstances provided by the lab, we can create
a proper counterfactual by randomly assigning ￿rm managers to either a
treatment in which some (but not all) technologies are subsidized, or to a
treatment in which there are no subsidies available. Thus, we control for
2We were in the lucky position to be able to recruit such managers from small￿and
medium￿ sized ￿rms using a data set maintained by the Dutch Ministry of Economic
A⁄airs.
2di⁄erences in economic circumstances as well as in ￿rm characteristics, and
we also prevent managers to self￿ select into those who are more or less prone
to soliciting subsidies for (unobservable) reasons that may be present in real
world situations. By using managers rather than students as subjects, we
prevent our results from being biased because the lack of experience stu-
dents have with investing in energy￿ saving technologies or appliances could
a⁄ect the way in which they cope with uncertainty and complexity (Ball
and Cech, 1996, p. 266).
The main question our study addresses is whether and how the decisions
in this investment problem are a⁄ected by the introduction of a technology
adoption subsidy. We compare a control treatment without a subsidy to a
treatment in which a subset of the most expensive technologies (i.e., those
with the highest expected input savings) is subsidized. In line with subsidy
programs such as the Energy Investment Credit (EIA) in the Netherlands,
the presence of a subsidy scheme has a dual impact in our experimental
setup. The ￿rst e⁄ect is that it increases the Net Present Value (NPV) of
the technologies within the subsidized set, which are typically also the most
expensive technologies. Although the subsidy improves the attractiveness
of only the most expensive technologies, we have chosen the parameters in
our experiment such that on average the subsidized technologies still have
a lower expected NPV than the non￿ subsidized ones. That is, the subsidy
narrows the pro￿tability gap but does not close it. The second e⁄ect of the
subsidy scheme is that it allows for directed search. If search can be directed
toward the subsidized technologies, search can also be directed away from
them. If NPV is the decision criterion, we can expect that the introduction of
the subsidy scheme leads to an increase in the search for the cheaper (non￿
subsidized) technologies with lower expected savings but higher expected
NPV. Clearly this setup provides a very stringent test of the e⁄ectiveness of
a subsidy.
In essence our framed experiment is an optimal stopping problem not
unlike job search models such as studied by, for example, Cox and Oaxaca
(1989, 1992), Schotter and Braunstein (1981), and Sonnemans (1998, 2000).
In these experiments decision makers are confronted with random wage o⁄ers
and need to decide whether to accept an o⁄er or to ask for another, where
each additional o⁄er involves a search cost. The decision problem that the
managers in our experiment face is substantially more complex, though. For
3example, the search costs are uncertain, the o⁄ers are two￿ dimensional, and
the number of periods each game lasts is uncertain.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the main features of the model. Section 3 describes the experimental
design and procedure. In section 4 we present the results and section 5 we
provide an explanation for the observed behavior. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we present a formal version of the decision problem that
motivated our experimental design. We also outline the solution to this
problem under the assumption that the decision maker is an unboundedly
rational and risk neutral pro￿t maximizer. Although we obviously cannot
expect our subjects to behave in line with this solution, it still serves as
a useful benchmark. First we consider the case in which no subsidies are
available, and then the case in which a subset of technologies is subsidized.
The decision maker in our model faces the option to invest in a new
technology. New technologies are of the e¢ ciency￿ improving kind: com-
pared to the existing technology, they yield savings on the use of a speci￿c
input. There is a range of technologies ￿ on the market￿that di⁄er in the
per￿ period savings they provide as well as with respect to the investment
costs associated with their adoption. We use e ￿ 0 to denote the monetary
savings per period, with e uniformly distributed on support [0;E]. Any new
technology purchased is assumed to replace the one currently in use; when
purchasing multiple new technologies, only the bene￿ts of the technology
most recently adopted count. The investment costs of new technologies are























where v is an (arbitrary) constant between 0 and 1=(1￿￿) such that @I=@e >
0 in the two subdomains. Note, however, that whereas I(e) is continuous
on [0;E], it is not di⁄erentiable at 1
2E. The investment function is ￿ atter
(steeper) to the left (right) of 1
2E.
In principle, technologies are in￿nitely lived, but we assume that the ￿rm
4is forced to exit the market with a constant probability. The probability of
surviving another period is denoted by ￿ (0 < ￿ < 1).3 Using (1), the Net















where superscript NS refers to the case of no subsidization.
Figure 1 illustrates this function. It is pyramid shaped with its top
at e = 1
2E; and symmetric to the left and right of this level of savings.
Accordingly, private bene￿ts of adopting a new technology are largest for
technologies in the middle range (with technology e = 1
2E providing the
highest expected NPV) and smaller the further they are away from the
middle range. This speci￿cation captures the idea that the most innovative
technologies are usually ￿ too expensive￿even if they provide a lot of per-
period bene￿ts.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The decision maker in our experiment cannot simply go and purchase
the technology with the highest expected NPV. She has to search for these
technologies, and this search is costly. We assume that in each period the
decision maker can search for at most one new technology. A search gener-
ates a technology o⁄er by means of a random draw (with replacement) from
the range [0;E].
When searching for a new technology, however, the decision maker does
not have time to also make optimal decisions with respect to the amount of
output she wishes to produce in the same period. Demand for her output
￿ uctuates, and hence the decision maker needs to readjust her production
decisions in every period in order to maximize pro￿ts from sales. We set the
expected value of the opportunity costs of searching (in terms of not being
able to optimally adjust output) equal to Z; see also the next section as well
as Appendix A.
Confronted with the choice to either search for a new technology or opti-
mally adjust her output, the decision maker has to trade o⁄the opportunity
cost of search against the possibility to ￿nd a better technology. It can be
3Theoretically, this is equivalent to imposing a time discount factor ￿:
5shown (see Appendix A) that under risk neutrality the optimal strategy is
to search until one ￿nds a technology with a NPV above some critical value
(￿(e) > ￿o). As illustrated in Figure 1, this implies that the decision maker
should search until she ￿nds a technology within a certain maximum dis-
tance d from the technology with the highest expected NPV, e = 1
2E. This
distance depends on the various parameters of our model (i.e., ￿ , E, v, and,
Z). For example, the more expensive it is to search, i.e. the higher search
cost Z, the less picky one should be with respect to accepting technology
o⁄ers, and hence the larger d will be. This completes the description of the
decision making problem in case of no subsidies.
Now suppose the government wishes to stimulate the adoption of tech-
nologies that provide higher per￿ period physical (and monetary) input sav-
ings. As these technologies have a lower NPV than those in the middle
range, the government may decide to subsidize those technologies at the top
end. Therefore we assume that when adopting technologies with savings e
in the range [ES;E] (with ES >> 1
2E), the ￿rm receives a subsidy of size
sI(e). That means that the subsidy function is speci￿ed as follows:
s(e) =
(
0 8e 2 [0;ESi
s > 0 8e 2 [ES;E]
(3)
Adding subsidies s(e)I(e) to the NPV de￿ned in equation (2), the ex-














v(1 ￿ s)(E ￿ e) + se=(1 ￿ ￿) 8e 2 [ES;E]
(4)
where superscript S refers to the case of subsidization. Figure 2 illustrates
this function. Its top is still at e = 1
2E; but now there is a discontinuous
upward jump at e = ES.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
As is the case in many (environmental) subsidy programs, decision mak-
ers in the Subsidy treatment can indicate whether they wish to receive a
technology o⁄er from the range of subsidized technologies [ES;E], or not
[0;ESi. Indeed, several programs o⁄er a list of technologies that are subsi-
6dized, and hence agents have the choice to look for a technology themselves,
or scrutinize the list of subsidized technologies.4 Hence, we allow for directed
search.
Subsidies have a dual impact on decision making in this setup, compared
to the no-subsidies case. They a⁄ect the technologies￿relative pro￿tabil-
ity, and they allow decision makers to deliberately search for subsidized or
non￿ subsidized technologies. For the parameters ES and s we chose in our
experiment, the expected NPV of a technology o⁄er drawn from the set
of subsidized technologies is smaller than that of an o⁄er drawn from the
set of non￿ subsidized technologies. Therefore, it is never optimal to search
for a subsidized technology because the expected NPV on domain [0;ES] is
strictly higher. As a result, the optimal search rule is analogous to the case
without subsidies: a critical value ￿0
0 of the expected NPV can be calculated
below which search should continue, and above which adoption is optimal.
This critical value is larger than in the case without the subsidy (￿0
0 > ￿0)
because the expected NPV of technologies in the range [0;ES] is larger than
the expected NPV of technologies in the range [0;E]. This critical NPV
can again be indicated by means of a horizontal line. As indicated in Fig-
ure 2, this implies that the decision maker should search until she ￿nds a
technology within a certain maximum distance d0 from the technology with
the highest expected NPV. Because ￿0
0 > ￿0, we have d0 < d. Since the
critical range is symmetric, the technology that will ultimately be adopted
has in expectation the same value of savings e; Efeje 2 [1
2E ￿ d0; 1
2E + d0]g
= Efeje 2 [1
2E ￿ d; 1
2E + d]} = 1
2E.5 So, the main predicted e⁄ect of the
subsidy is that search will be directed away from the subsidized technolo-
gies. The technologies actually adopted, though, will be characterized by
the same level of average savings, irrespective of the presence of the subsidy.
This prediction holds for unboundedly rational (risk neutral) decision
makers. The subjects in our experiment are professionals in their ￿eld, and
4An example of such a program is the Energy Investment Credit (EIA) program in
the Netherlands, which only subsidizes energy￿ saving technologies that appear on the
so￿ called Energy List. See Aalbers et al. (2007) for details.
5The subsidy should induce exclusive search for non-subsidised technologies. This
increases the probability that a technology o⁄er will be within the acceptable range even
though the acceptable range is somewhat smaller in this case (d











2E + d] j e 2 [0;E]}. As a result the
subsidy scheme will increase the adoption speed compared to the no subsidies case. For
the parameters in our experiment, however, this e⁄ect is rather small.
7experienced in making investment decisions in complex environments. So
the natural null hypothesis is that they will make decisions much in line
with these predictions, rendering the subsidy ine⁄ective. The alternative
hypothesis is that the subsidy adds something distinctly positive to the
top-end technologies, making them more attractive and leading to more in-
vestments. Moreover, to the extent that this is indeed the case, we postulate
that managers from smaller ￿rms (who can be expected to have less spe-
cialized experience in making investment decisions) are more likely to be
a⁄ected by the subsidy than those of larger ￿rms.
3 The experiment
3.1 Experimental design
The experiment was run as a between￿ subjects design with the level of
the subsidy (no subsidy or 6% subsidy) as treatment factor. Subjects are
randomly assigned to one of the treatments and in total 48 managers par-
ticipated in the experiment, distributed equally between the two treatments
(see Table 1). The experiment is an individual decision making experiment,
i.e. with no interaction between subjects, and this was also stressed to the
subjects. A copy of the instructions for the subsidy treatment can be found
in Appendix B.
Table 1. Overview of the treatments
Treatment Subsidy # subjects # games
NS no 25 125
S 6 % 23 115
Each subject played 6 games; the ￿rst was an unpaid practise trial, the
last ￿ve were paid out. All games were identical, apart from the realization
of random variables (see below). Each game consisted of a sequence of
periods. After each period there was a 90% chance that the game would go
to the next period and a 10% chance that the game would end (i.e. ￿ = 0:9):
The number of periods of the games was randomly determined before the
experiment by means of throws with a ten￿ sided die. This resulted in games
with lengths of 4, 5, 9, 11, and 22 periods. The length of the practise game
was ￿xed at 10 (the expected length of a game). The sequencing of game
lengths was varied across subjects.
8At the beginning of each period subjects had to choose between (i) setting
output, and (ii) searching for a new technology. If they chose to set output
they could not search for (or adopt) a new technology, and vice versa. When
subjects decided to set output, they had to choose the number of units of
output they wanted to produce. They knew the demand function (P(Q) =
at ￿ 2
375Q) and the cost function (C(Q) = 1:6Q), and hence pro￿ts were
equal to PQ￿1:6Q. The variable at was a random variable (￿ uctuations in
demand) drawn independently in each period from a uniform distribution
on [1.6,2.4]. The value of a was revealed to the subjects only after they had
made their choice whether to set output or to search for a new technology. If
they had chosen to search, they were informed about the value of a but could
not act on it; output was set equal to zero (Q = 0) and consequently the sales
pro￿ts were also equal to zero. If they had chosen to set output, they could
act on the information about a revealed by optimally adjusting output Q.
To facilitate ￿nding the optimal amount, subjects were also provided with
a pro￿t table which gave the value of pro￿ts as a function of Q for di⁄erent
realizations of a. With the help of this table it was easy to determine the
optimal level of Q given a (and subjects made few mistakes here). It can be
derived that with this setup expected sales pro￿ts (Z) were equal to 10 (see
Appendix A), and this constitutes the opportunity costs of searching for a
new technology.6
Regarding technology choice, subjects were informed about the relation-
ship between I and e (cf. (1)) by means of both a ￿gure and a table (see
Appendix B). When searching for a new technology in the No￿ Subsidy treat-
ment, subjects knew they would receive a technology o⁄er randomly drawn
from the uniform distribution on [0;25] (i.e. E = 25), and they were in-
formed about both the per￿ period savings e and the associated investment
costs I(e). Then they had to decide, ￿rst, whether they liked this technology
better than the one they liked best until now (if any), and second, whether
they wanted to purchase their preferred technology.7
In the Subsidy treatment, subjects were informed that there was a sub-
sidy of 6% o⁄ the investment cost I(e) if they decided to buy a technology
6Note that the fact that we embed the investment choice in a richer decision environ-
ment implies search costs that are not exogenous as in most search experiments. This
special feature of our framed ￿eld experiment is included to better mimic reality.
7In the ￿rst period of each game the preferred technology was a default technology
with no savings, i.e. e = I = 0.
9with bene￿ts of e = 22 or higher (i.e. ES = 22). Here subjects had to decide
whether they wanted to search for a technology without subsidy, in which
case e would be randomly drawn from the uniform distribution on [0;22i,
or to search for a subsidized technology, in which case e would be randomly
drawn from the uniform distribution on [22;25]. After this choice subjects
were informed about the bene￿ts e, the corresponding investment costs I(e),
and the size of the subsidy S of the current technology o⁄er. Then, as in
the No-Subsidy treatment, they had to decide whether they liked this of-
fer better than the one they liked best so far, and whether they wanted to
purchase their preferred technology.
At the end of the period, subjects were informed about their earnings
for the period. If the game continued, the procedure in the new period
was identical to the previous one. If the game ended, the experiment would
proceed to period 1 of the next game, or, if there had been six games already,
the experiment would end. A subject￿ s earnings in the experiment were equal
to the accumulated earnings in games 2￿ 6. Note that in each game, the total
earnings are equal to the sum of the pro￿ts from setting quantity Q plus
the sum of all per￿ period bene￿ts (e) from the technology used minus the
investment cost (I) for each technology purchased plus any subsidies (S) on
technologies purchased.
By inserting the parameter values used in the experiment in the model,
and assuming risk neutral payo⁄ maximizing agents we can derive the op-
timal search strategy. We only mention the most important properties of
that strategy here. First of all, parameters are chosen such that the ex-
pected net bene￿ts of searching for a new technology are positive. Next,
it is always best to start searching in the ￿rst period of a game. A new
technology that is adopted becomes productive in the same period in which
the adoption takes place, and neither new information arrives over time nor
do available technologies become more e¢ cient over time. By postponing
searching, one foregoes the pro￿t ￿ ow associated with the use of the technol-
ogy earlier in the game. Third, in the No￿ Subsidy treatment it is optimal
to purchase any technology o⁄er with savings (e) between 3.93 and 21.07
(i.e., d = 8:57). The probability of receiving such an o⁄er in every period
equals (21:07 ￿ 3:93)=25 = 0:69, and hence the expected number of periods
before adoption takes place (the optimal expected adoption speed) equals
1=0:69 = 1:46. In the Subsidy treatment, we chose the parameter values such
10that it is optimal to direct search toward the non￿ subsidized technologies.
When doing so it is optimal to purchase any technology with savings (e)
between 4.39 and 20.61 (i.e., d0 = 8:11), which implies an optimal expected
adoption speed of 1:36 periods.
3.2 Experimental procedure
All sessions of the computerized experiment were run at the CentERLab,
Tilburg University, between May and October 2004, using the software z￿
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 48 subjects participated in the treat-
ments reported in this paper.8 The subjects were professional managers
recruited by means of letters. We invited managers of whom we knew that
they had recent experience with making (subsidized) investment decisions
in new technologies (e.g. energy saving, noise reduction, air ￿ltering, waste
reduction) and whose companies were located within one hour￿ s car drive
from Tilburg. Addressees were informed that depending on their decisions
and chance, they could expect to earn somewhere between 50 and 300 Euros.
If they were interested they could react by phone or e￿ mail. Because of work
obligations all sessions were scheduled in the evening (as of 7 p.m.). The
managers had very heterogeneous backgrounds. If we de￿ne small, medium-
sized and large ￿rms as those with a turnover of less than 0.5 mln Euro,
between 0.5 and 5 mln Euro, more than 5 mln Euro, respectively, then 16
managers were from small ￿rms, 22 from medium-sized ￿rms, and 10 from
large ￿rms.
The experimental procedure was the same in all sessions. Subjects were
randomly assigned to computers, which were separated by partitions. They
received a copy of the instructions (see Appendix B), and the experimenter
read the instructions aloud. Subjects were told that they would play the
role of a manager in a ￿rm operating in a market and that the experiment
8The experiment discussed in this paper is part of a bigger research project, which was
￿nanced by the Ministry of Economic A⁄airs (EZ) and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial
Planning and the Environment (VROM), where the former can be regarded a sceptic and
the latter a believer of investment subsidies. In this project we ran a total of 17 di⁄erent
treatments to investigate the e⁄ect of the design of subsidies on technology adoption.
Treatment factors include the level of the subsidy, the set of subsidized technologies,
presence of technological change, search costs, and the level of uncertainty. Because of
budget limitations and because of the large numbers of subjects required, all but the
treatments reported in this paper were run only with students as subjects. For a brief
overview of the results see Aalbers et al. 2005 (in Dutch).
11would consist of 5 independent games and one practise game, each lasting
several periods. After that the subjects could privately ask questions. Then
the experiment started with the practise game, which had a ￿xed and known
length of 10 periods. When subjects ￿nished the practise game they could
continue with the rest of the experiment and complete it at their own pace.
After ￿nishing game 6, subjects were asked to ￿ll in a questionnaire about
some background information of their ￿rm, for which they received 50 euros
extra.9 Finally, subjects were privately paid their total earnings and left the
room. The duration of the experiment varied between one and two hours.
In the experiment it is possible to actually make losses, and in fact,
two subjects did. Negative earnings in the experiment translated into zero
earnings for the experiment, but all subjects were entitled to the 50 euros
show up fee. The managers earned on average 200 euros.
4 Results
From a policy perspective, the main variable of interest is the average re-
alized cost￿ savings. This variable is determined by two underlying decision
variables: the period in which a technology is adopted (the adoption speed)
and the savings associated with the adopted technology. We will ￿rst look at
the average realized cost savings and then discuss each of the two underlying
decision variables.
Table 2. Mean realized savings
game No￿ Subsidy Subsidy
2 10.04 (4.64) 15.62 (8.28)
3 10.52 (6.91) 14.05 (9.77)
4 9.64 (7.89) 14.58 (8.68)
5 8.31 (5.61) 12.34 (9.63)
6 7.56 (6.17) 9.99 (9.78)
total 9.21 (6.34) 13.31 (9.30)
Table 2 displays the mean realized per￿ period savings for each game and
for both treatments (standard deviations are in parentheses). The table
9This 50 euros may be viewed as a show up fee. Managers received a much higher fee
than the usual student fee to cover travel expenses and the extra time needed to complete
the questionnaire.
12shows that in all games more savings are attained in the Subsidy treatment
than in the No￿ Subsidy treatment. As can be seen in the bottom row, taking
all games together, per￿ period savings in the Subsidy treatment (13.31) are
about 45% higher than in the No￿ Subsidy treatment (9.21). This di⁄erence
is highly signi￿cant according to a non￿ parametric Mann￿ Whitney U test
(p = 0:013).10 The di⁄erence decreases somewhat over the games, but
even in the last game the treatment e⁄ect is still substantial.11 It can be
concluded that the managers are a⁄ected by the introduction of a subsidy
scheme. Overall, their search and adoption behavior leads to signi￿cantly
higher per￿ period savings in the Subsidy treatment.
We now turn to the factors that determine total per￿ periods savings
in a game: the speed of adoption and the actual technology purchased.
Table 3 presents the adoption speed by treatment, that is the average period
in which the ￿rst technology is bought. Two di⁄erent measures for the
adoption speed are used in the table depending on how they account for
games in which no adoption takes place (what is the speed of something
that did not yet happen?). When no technology is bought the adoption
period is either set equal to the actual duration of that game (upper row)
or to the average expected duration of a game, i.e. 10 periods (bottom
row). Irrespective of the measure we see that on average managers adopt a
technology somewhat later in the Subsidy treatment than in the No￿ Subsidy
treatment. In either case, however, the hypothesis of equal adoption speeds
across the two treatments cannot be rejected, as indicated by the high p￿
values in the last column.
Table 3. Mean period of adoption by treatment
10Unless indicated otherwise all averages and statistical tests are based on strictly inde-
pendent data, namely one observation per individual. For each subject we ￿rst compute
the mean realised savings per game by dividing the total savings in a game by the number
of periods in that game. Next we take the (unweighted) average of all ￿ve games per
subject. The reported standard deviations are also calculated at the level of the individ-
ual (rather than the game). As experimental data are generally highly non-normal we
use non-parametric tests. More speci￿c, statistical signi￿cance of the treatment e⁄ect is
based on two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests.
11The low mean realized savings in game 6 are mainly caused by the fact that by
coincidence game 6 on average consists of fewer periods than the other games.
13No adoption period measure Treatment
No￿ Subsidy Subsidy
actual game durationa 2.42 (1.01) 3.33 (2.56) p = 0:703
expected game durationb 2.88 (1.35) 3.57 (2.60) p = 0:936
a: if no adoption, adoption period = actual game length
b: if no adoption, adoption period = 10
Table 3 suggests the presence of a substantial amount of variation in
adoption speed, in particular in the Subsidy treatment. To look into this
in more detail, Figure 3 presents a histogram of the adoption periods of all
games. The bars display the percentage of games in which a technology is
adopted in periods 1, 2, 3, and so on, as well as the percentage of games in
which no technology is bought at all (No). The ￿gure shows that the ma-
jority of managers do in fact buy at least one technology and predominantly
do so early in a game. In the No￿ Subsidy (Subsidy) treatment managers
seem to be somewhat more (less) willing to invest as the percentage of those
who did not purchase any technologies is 11% (21%) in that treatment.12
Moreover, in the No￿ Subsidy treatment subjects adopt relatively often in
periods 3 to 5 compared to the Subsidy treatment.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
If we only consider the games in which subjects in fact adopt a technology
there is little di⁄erence between the treatments. Compared to the theoretical
prediction, derived in section 3.1, it turns out that the average adoption
speed is too low, i.e. subjects search too much. This seems to be in contrast
to much of the search literature, which suggests that people search too little
compared to a risk neutral benchmark (e.g. Schotter and Braunstein, 1981,
Cox and Oaxaca, 1989, 1992, Sonnemans 1998, 2000). It is in line, however,
with the idea that under￿ searching is prevalent in simple environments, but
that over￿ searching is more likely to occur in richer environments like ours
(see Zwick and Lee, 1999, Zwick et al., 2003).
These ￿ndings on the adoption speed cannot explain the large ￿ and
signi￿cant￿di⁄erence in realized savings across the two treatments (see Ta-
ble 2). The fact that on average managers buy later (or not at all) in the
12The percentage of games without adoption varies only little across games.
14Subsidy treatment has a negative e⁄ect on realized savings. Therefore, the
treatment e⁄ect must be driven by di⁄erences in the type of technologies
that are actually adopted. To this we turn now.
First recall that in the Subsidy treatment, subjects can decide to direct
search to the subsidized or non￿ subsidized technologies. It turns out that
subjects in the Subsidy treatment search for subsidized (non￿ subsidized)
technologies in 47% (53%) of the periods.13 Given their search direction,
subjects in the Subsidy treatment are confronted with o⁄ers of expensive
technologies more often than subjects in the No￿ Subsidy treatment. To
be precise, in the No￿ Subsidy treatment managers are o⁄ered an expensive
technology (with savings between 22 and 25) in only 11% of the periods in
which a search takes place and no technology has been adopted yet.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The natural next question then is which technologies subjects actually
buy. Figure 4 shows a histogram of the adopted technologies per game for
both treatments. What stands out immediately is the spike in the interval
[22;25] in the Subsidy treatment. In this treatment, 54% of the adopted
technologies is in the range [22, 25], whereas this is only 5% in the No￿
Subsidy treatment. In terms of the number of o⁄ered technologies actually
purchased, this di⁄erence is indeed substantial. Whereas in the No￿ Subsidy
treatment 5 out of 17 technologies in this range are adopted (29%), the
corresponding numbers in the Subsidy treatment are 50 and 56 (89%). This
is also re￿ ected in Table 4, which presents the mean level of per￿ period
savings of the technologies adopted in the two treatments. The average
adopted technology in the Subsidy treatment (18.29) is almost twice as large
as that in the No￿ Subsidy treatment (10.90), and the di⁄erence is highly
signi￿cant (p < 0:001). Table 4 illustrates, moreover, that this pattern is
similar in all games.14 This clearly shows that the presence of the subsidy
13Here we focus on the periods in which an actual search takes place and no technology
has been adopted yet. Although the fraction of searches among subsidized technolgies
decreases somewhat across games (56% in game 2, 59% in game 3, 46% in game 4, 39%
in game 5, and 33% in game 6) the percentage is still considerable in the last game,
especially given the fact that according to the theoretical prediction no search at all
should be conducted in that subset.
14Although the di⁄erence between the two treatments is smaller in the last game than in
game 5, it is still statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level, as it is in all games. In addition,
none of the mean adopted technologies within a treatment (across games) are signi￿cantly
di⁄erent according to a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test.
15induces subjects to adopt more expensive technologies.
Table 4. mean adopted technology
treatment







Finally, it is interesting to analyze whether the introduction of the sub-
sidy is actually bene￿cial for the subjects. The fact that mean realized
savings are higher need not imply that the subjects in this treatment do
better in terms of ￿nal payo⁄s (as the technically more e¢ cient technologies
are also the more expensive ones). In fact, the average payo⁄s are lower
in the Subsidy than in the No￿ Subsidy treatment: payo⁄s drop from 125.2
(standard deviation 29.6) to 115.6 (standard deviation 21.2) with the intro-
duction of the subsidy. The di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant though
(p = 0:252).15
In sum, our results indicate that enabling directed search for subsidized
technologies has two e⁄ects. The ￿rst e⁄ect is that in the Subsidy treat-
ment many more expensive technologies are searched for and adopted. Sec-
ondly, the presence of the subsidy also seems to make subjects somewhat
more reluctant to adopt a technology, as is witnessed by the increase in the
percentage of games without adoptions. The signi￿cantly higher realized
average per￿ period savings in the Subsidy treatment clearly imply that the
￿rst e⁄ect dominates the second. The presence of the subsidy leads to a
signi￿cant and persistent change in behavior which, however, runs counter
to the predictions of the rational choice model.
15Note that for a risk-neutral rational decision maker the expected payo⁄s are actually
a little higher in the Subsidy than in the No-Subsidy treatment. This is not because the
subsidies make some technologies less expensive; after all, it is optimal to request non-
subsidized technology o⁄ers. The reason is that treatment S allows for directed search in
the region e 2 [0;ESi, through which the unpro￿table technologies in the region [ES;E]
are excluded from the search process, whereas they remain possible in the No-Subsidy
treatment. Consequently, the expected value of a technology o⁄er from the range [0;ESi
is larger than that of a draw from [0;E].
165 Discussion
How should the positive e⁄ect of the subsidy on the level of investments be
explained? One possibility is that given the complexity of the decision prob-
lem in our experiment, we just pick up random behavior. There are strong
indications though that behavior is in fact not random. One indication for
this can be obtained from Figure 4. This ￿gure suggests that the adopted
technologies in the No￿ Subsidy treatment do not follow a uniform distri-
bution, but they depend on the level of savings; the share of technologies
adopted in the higher savings range (e > 16) is clearly lower than for the
other technologies. This idea is con￿rmed by the results of a logit regression
(not shown here but available upon request) in which the adoption decisions
in the No￿ Subsidy treatment are related to the level of per￿ period savings.
The regression results indicate that the estimated probability of adopting a
technology is a pyramid￿ shaped function of the amount of per￿ period sav-
ings, with a maximum at 10.0 (which is clearly below 12.5, which may be due
to risk aversion). Moreover, as can be inferred from Figure 5, technologies in
the range [22,25] are quite unpopular in the No￿ Subsidy treatment. So, we
would regard it quite unlikely that, when given the chance to direct search
toward these technologies, subjects would do so merely out of confusion or
by mistake.
In view of the fact that the adoption decisions follow quite a consistent
and reasonable pattern in the No￿ Subsidy treatment, we conjecture that
from the subjects￿perspective the subsidy must add something distinctly
positive. The ￿nancial aspect of the subsidy is clearly part of this, but as we
have discussed above, this is not enough to make the subsidized technologies
more pro￿table than the non￿ subsidized ones. An additional factor may
be that the presence of a subsidy invokes a positive connotation, in much
the same way as a discount, a rebate or a sales price do. Such a positive
connotation may carry enough weight in an agent￿ s decision making process
to tip the balance in favor of the subsidized technologies.16
Modern theories in cognitive psychology emphasize that decision making
16Alternatively, the presence of a subsidy may be interpreted by the subjects as a kind
of endorsement and as a signal that there is something "good" about these technologies
that warrants their purchase to be stimulated. However, the converse, that the subjects
see the subsidy as a signal that these technologies are not in their best self-interest can-
not be excluded either. What matters is people￿ s attitude toward and interpretation of
(government) subsidies, and there is little direct evidence on this as far as we know.
17in complex situations is driven not only by conscious, cognitive, consequen-
tialist reasoning but also by spontaneous, associative, a⁄ective processes;
see for example the literature on the a⁄ect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2002),
risk￿ as￿ feelings (Loewenstein et al., 2001), and dual￿ process models (Kah-
neman, 2003). We expect that the basic decision environment as presented
to the subjects in our experiment is relatively neutral and generates little af-
fective valence. In such an environment, we can expect cognitive processing
to supply the main inputs for the decisions at hand. At the same time, the
decision problem is also quite complex, and it is unlikely that the subjects
will be fully con￿dent that they are able to solve this problem in a purely
rational and calculative manner. Environments like these are particularly
prone to the in￿ uence of a⁄ective processes. If a certain element of the deci-
sion environment evokes a positive feeling or association ￿even though only
weak ￿this may exert quite a strong in￿ uence on subjects￿judgments and
choices. Hence, to the extent that the presence of a ￿subsidy￿generates a
positive a⁄ect, this will render the subset of options to which this subsidy
is attached more attractive than in its absence.
Another factor may be that search among subsidized technologies gives
more precise and less uncertain results. If subjects search among subsi-
dized technologies any o⁄er has savings between 22 and 25. In contrast, the
range of possible savings is much larger if they search among non-subsidized
technologies in the Subsidy treatment. That this may positively a⁄ect the
search for subsidized technologies is in line with the so￿ called evaluability
principle. This says that not only the valence but also the precision of an
a⁄ective impression may a⁄ect judgement and decision making, and easier
and more precise signals are weighted more heavily (Slovic et al., 2002).
We do not have any direct evidence that subsidies generate a positive
a⁄ect nor that it is a main driver of the decision to search for subsidized
technologies. There is some circumstantial evidence which is consistent with
this hypothesis though. In particular, the dual￿ process models of behavior
suggest that feelings are less likely to play a role in case a neutral, e⁄ortful,
cognitive evaluation can handle a problem well and leads to an unambigu-
ous solution (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). We should therefore expect
subjects with more experience and more con￿dence in handling complicated
risky investment decisions to be less in￿ uenced by a positive a⁄ect which
the presence of a subsidy may engender than those who are relatively inex-
18perienced.
To explore this issue we use the classi￿cation of small, medium-sized, and
large ￿rms as de￿ned above and calculate the averaged per￿ period realized
savings by treatment for managers of each of these subgroups. Figure 5
presents the results of this exercise. The ￿gure indicates that the e⁄ect
of the subsidy is much smaller for managers operating in larger ￿rms; for
managers of large ￿rms there is hardly any e⁄ect of the subsidy, while for
managers of small ￿rms its introduction results in a more than 100% increase
in the per￿ period savings obtained (and the latter di⁄erence is signi￿cant at
p < 0.01).
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
Interestingly, in line with the hypothesis that investment managers from
bigger ￿rms approach the problem in a more cognitive and a⁄ectively neutral
way is the fact that in the post￿ experimental questionnaire these managers
indicate more often that their decisions were based on some kind of deci-
sion rule, like the calculation of a critical payback period of an technology
investment. To be precise 31% of the managers from small ￿rms indicated
that their decisions were rule￿ based, while as much as 75% (60%) of the
managers from large (intermediately large) ￿rms indicated so. Obviously,
when decisions are rule￿ based, there is little room for an in￿ uence of a⁄ect.
Further support for the hypothesis that subsidies generate a positive
a⁄ect is obtained from subjects￿search behavior. First, it turns out that
subjects conduct more searches until they buy a technology in the No￿
Subsidy treatment than in the Subsidy treatment. Focusing on search before
the ￿rst adoption, the subjects in the No￿ Subsidy treatment on average use
1.60 searches for every adoption (173/108), whereas in the Subsidy treatment
this is only 1.32 (120/91). The di⁄erence between the two treatments is
signi￿cant at the 2% level on the basis of a two￿ sided Fisher Exact test on
game data. This ￿nding is consistent with the hypothesis that actors become
less uncertain when they receive a clear a⁄ective signal. More evidence in
favor of this hypothesis obtains if we look at continued search behavior.
Continued search refers to the fact that subjects may continue their searches
even after they have already adopted a technology ￿ even though this is not
consistent with rationality. In the 91 games in the Subsidy treatment in
which a technology was bought a total of 30 additional searches were carried
19out, which gives an average ￿ continued search￿percentage of 33%. In the
No￿ Subsidy treatment this occurred 80 times in 108 games, so that the
average ￿ continued search￿percentage is as high as 74%. So subjects in the
No￿ Subsidy treatment not only search more until the ￿rst adoption, they
also carry on searching more often after they have purchased a technology.
Although these ￿ndings are short of being direct evidence, they are all
in line with the hypothesis that introducing a subsidy generates a positive
a⁄ect, which reduces ambiguity and facilitates decision making.17
6 Conclusions
In this paper we experimentally evaluate the behavioral impact of a tech-
nology adoption subsidy on adoption behavior. We use the experimental
method to control for confounding factors that a⁄ect investment decisions.
Moreover, we try to further external validity by (i) providing context to
the experiment, and incorporating several features which are also relevant
for actual decision making in the ￿eld (e.g., uncertainty about whether the
search for a good technology will be successful, accounting for the fact that
a search comes at a cost because of scarce managerial time), and (ii) using
professional managers experienced in investment decision making as sub-
jects (rather than students). Consistent with reality, the range of new tech-
nologies currently ￿ on the market￿consists of technologies that di⁄er in the
amount of input savings they provide as well as with respect to their pur-
chase price, with the higher savings technologies being disproportionally
more expensive than the lower savings technologies. We compare search
and adoption behavior across two treatments, one in which no subsidies
are available, and one in which the top 12% of the technologies (as mea-
sured in per￿ period savings) are subsidized. The theoretical predictions are
straightforward. First, the subsidy provided is too low to render the top 12%
17An interesting hypothesis is that it is not so much the actual level of the subsidy that
matters, but more the fact that certain options are subsidized. We did not have access
to enough managers to investigate this hypothesis, but we did examine this hypothesis
with student subjects. The students were subjected to the same experimental design as
the one described above (only with lower payo⁄ levels). We ran one treatment with no
subsidy, one with a subsidy of 6% and one with a subsidy of 13%. The results for the ￿rst
two treatments are very much in line with those of the manager subjects. The presence
of a subsidy signi￿cantly increased the average level of realized savings, from 11.2 to 14.3.
However, increasing the level of the subsidy to 13% did not have an e⁄ect. Average realized
savings (13.3) were actually (insigni￿cantly) lower than with a subsidy of 6%.
20technologies economically pro￿table so that search should be directed at the
non￿ subsidized technologies. Second, and as a result, search and adoption
behavior should be identical in the two treatments.
The results of our experiment do not support these predictions. We ￿nd
that providing a subsidy results in increased search and adoption of the
top￿ end technologies, and subsequently results in a substantial and persis-
tent increase in the amount of savings obtained over the game￿ s duration.
Actually establishing why ￿ a nominal￿subsidy is so e⁄ective in changing
investment behavior is di¢ cult, but analysis of the actual behavior of indi-
vidual managers suggests that the main impact of the subsidy is via reducing
complexity. The subsidy adds an element of positive a⁄ective valence to an
otherwise neutral but complex decision problem. Managers￿perception of
the complexity problem is likely to be a function of whether or not they use
formal adoption rules, and indeed we ￿nd that our subsidy is much less ef-
fective in changing the behavior of managers of larger ￿rms (who self￿ report
that they use formal decision rules) than of those of smaller ￿rms (whose
decision making process seems to be less well￿ structured). Our results sug-
gests that even ￿ nominal￿subsidies may be highly e⁄ective - which is not to
say e¢ cient - in changing (investment) behavior, particularly so for decision
environments which are perceived as complex by the decision makers and
which have low a⁄ective valence to them.
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23Appendix A. Optimal search strategy
The optimal search strategy depends on both the opportunity costs of
searching and the bene￿ts of ￿nding an even better technology. We ￿rst
calculate the opportunity costs of searching, and then present the optimal
search strategy.
The decision maker in our experiment is assumed to be a monopolist
in his output market and faces the following downward￿ sloping demand
function:
P(Qt) = at ￿ bQt;
The consumers￿willingness to pay for the ￿rm￿ s output thus depends on
the quantity of output produced, but also on the state of the economy. The
demand function￿ s vertical intercept (at) is assumed to be stochastic, and
is drawn in each period from a uniform distribution at 2 [a ￿ ";a + "], with
0 < " < a. Marginal production costs equal c, so that the ￿rm￿ s objective is
to maximize P(Qt jat)Qt￿cQt, and hence the best￿ response function of the
monopolist to ￿ uctuations in demand is Q￿
t(at) = (at￿c)=2b, and associated
optimized pro￿ts equal (at ￿ c)
2 =4b.
Information about the state of the economy (at) is disclosed only after
the ￿rm has decided whether to search for a new technology, or not. If
he requested to receive a technology o⁄er, he is unable to optimally adjust
output and, for simplicity, output is set equal to zero (and hence sales pro￿ts
are zero too). If he decided not to search, he is able to optimally adjust
















Next we determine the optimal investment strategy under risk neutrality.
We focus on the case in which no technology subsidies are available; the case
of subsidization is analogous and available from the authors upon request.
Suppose that the decision maker receives a technology o⁄er e0 (from the
range [0;E]) with a Net Present Value ￿0 = ￿(e0). If e0 is smaller than
1
2E, the range of technologies he would prefer lies in the region [e0;E ￿ e0].
If e0 is larger than 1
2E, the range of technologies she would prefer lies in
the region [E ￿ e0;e0]. So, if we de￿ne eL0 ￿ min[e0;E ￿ e0] and eH0 ￿
max[e0;E ￿ e0], we have ￿0 ￿ ￿(e0) = ￿(eL0) = ￿(eH0), and the range of
24technologies that are preferred to the current o⁄er e0 is [eL0;eH0]. When
requesting a new o⁄er, the probability (p0 ￿ p(e0)) of receiving a better
o⁄er thus equals p0 = (eH0 ￿ eL0)=E = (E ￿ 2eL0)=E, and, conditional on





All technology o⁄ers with ￿ ￿ ￿0 have zero value (as the decision maker can
always decide to adopt e0 as this o⁄er remains valid throughout the game).
Therefore, using (2), the expected bene￿ts of asking for a new technology
o⁄er (given e0) are equal to













Now we can de￿ne the critical technology o⁄er as that technology with a
speci￿c NPV for which a risk￿ neutral decision maker is indi⁄erent between
adopting it and continuing the search for an even better technology (that
is, a technology with a higher NPV). When deciding to continue the search
upon having received o⁄er e0, the decision maker forgoes the pro￿ts he
could obtain in the output market, the expected value of which is equal to
Z. In addition, he needs to take into consideration (i) the probability (1￿ ￿)
that the game does not continue to a next period, and (ii) the fact that
if the next o⁄er does not yield a better technology o⁄er, he can continue
requesting new o⁄ers as long as the game does not end (which is the case
with probability ￿). The expected bene￿ts of continuing searching for a more
pro￿table technology equal ￿[EB (￿0) ￿ Z] + ￿2(1 ￿ p0)[EB (￿0) ￿ Z] +
￿3(1￿p0)2 [EB (￿0) ￿ Z] :::, which converges to ￿[EB (￿0) ￿ Z]=(1￿￿(1￿
p0)). The bene￿ts of actually adopting the current technology o⁄er e0 equal
￿0. The critical technology o⁄er is thus implicitly determined by
￿[EB (￿0) ￿ Z]=(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p0)) = ￿0: (6)
Given that initially the ￿rm has a default technology (i.e., e = 0), the
optimal strategy is to request a new technology o⁄er. If the technology
o⁄ered has eL ￿ eL0, the agents should adopt it and focus on optimal output
decisions for the remaining periods. If the o⁄er has eL < eL0, the agent
should continue to search in the next period.
25Appendix B: Experimental Instructions
This appendix contains the instructions used in the Subsidy treatment.
The instructions for the no subsidy treatment were adapted accordingly and
are available from the authors upon request.
Instructions
You are about to participate in an experiment on individual decisionmaking,
which means that there is no interaction with other participants. You will be
asked to take a number of decisions. The decisions that you take will a⁄ect your
earnings. If you take your decisions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount
of money. You can collect your earnings in cash as of next week in B303. During
the experiment your earnings will be denoted in points. After the experiment your
earnings will be converted into Euros at a rate of 1 point is 2 Eurocents, and hence
100 points = 2 Euros. During the experiment, you are not allowed to talk to other
participants.
In the experiment, you will play the role of a manager of a ￿rm operating in
a market. The experiment will consist of 5 independent games and each game will
consist of several periods. In each period, you can either decide on the quantity of
units of output you wish to produce, or you can decide to be informed about the
possibility to buy a new technology that yields a ￿xed amount of bene￿ts in each
period. We will now describe these two decisions in more detail.
Setting the quantity of output you produce
Q denotes the quantity of output you decide to produce. This output will be
sold at a market. P denotes the price per unit and this price decreases if you produce
more units. To be precise, the price is determined by the following relationship:
Due to ￿ uctuations in demand, which are outside of your control, A is a variable
that varies from period to period. It can take any value between 1.60 and 2.40,
where each value is equally likely. A is determined separately and independently
for each period. The production costs are 1.60 points per unit. So if you produce
Q units in a period, your production costs are 1.60Q. Your pro￿ts are equal to
revenues minus production costs: PQ ￿1.60Q
For your quantity you may choose any integer value between 0 and 100, that is
0, 1, 2, ..., 99, 100.
However, rather than using the above formula, you can also use the pro￿t table
(Table 1) which is attached at the end of the instructions. This table gives your
pro￿ts for di⁄erent combinations of Q and A, which can help you to ￿nd the best Q
26for di⁄erent realizations of A. In the ￿rst column (in grey print), you ￿nd a series
of possible quantities of output that you can decide to produce, ranging from 0
to 100. In the ￿rst row (in grey print), you ￿nd a series of possible values of A,
ranging from 1.60 to 2.40. To determine your pro￿ts, ￿nd the intersection of the
relevant column (the value of A), and row (the quantity Q). The cell in the table
thus identi￿ed gives you the resulting amount of pro￿ts for this combination of Q
and A.
Example. Suppose you are informed that the relevant value of A in a period
equals 2.20. And suppose you decide to produce 20 units of output. Find the
intersection of column A=2.20 and row Q=20. You see that your pro￿ts are 9.87
points.
If you do not enter a quantity yourself then the computer will enter a default
value of Q = 0. This value gives you zero pro￿ts, independent of the value of A
(see also Table 1). If you set your quantity yourself you may do better because you
can adjust your quantity depending on the value of A.
Buying a new technology
You also have the possibility to buy a new technology. From the moment of
purchase onwards, a new technology gives you a certain amount of bene￿ts in every
period. The per￿ period bene￿ts are denoted by E. If you invest in a technology
with bene￿ts E, this means that in the present and all future periods of the present
game your earnings will increase by E points. This increase in your earnings does
not depend on your quantity Q or on A.
Buying a new technology also involves an investment cost which we denote by
I. This cost of investment will be subtracted from your earnings if you buy the
technology. Note that you incur the cost I only in the period in which you buy the
technology, while you receive the bene￿ts from the technology in the present and
all future periods of the present game.
There are di⁄erent technologies that vary with respect to the per￿ period ben-
e￿ts (E). The bene￿ts range from E = 0 to E = 25. Generally, a technology with
higher bene￿ts (E) is also more expensive (higher I). In fact, there is a precise rela-
tionship between the bene￿ts (E) and the investment cost (I) of a technology. The
following ￿gure gives this relationship.
27Relation between Benefits (E)


























The ￿gure shows that investment costs range from I = 0 points for a technology
with E = 0 to I = 250 points for the technology with E = 25. Furthermore, the
￿gure is relatively ￿ at until E = 12.5 and becomes steeper after E = 12.5. To
be precise, for lower levels of bene￿ts (below E = 12.5), a technology that yields
one additional unit of bene￿ts in every period as compared to another, is 4 points
more expensive, while for higher levels of bene￿ts (above E = 12.5) each additional
unit of bene￿ts implies an additional investment cost of 16 points. Table 2, which
is attached at the end of the instructions, summarizes the information about the
relation between E and I.
Those technologies that yield the largest amount of per￿ period bene￿ts, are
subsidized. The subsidy, denoted with S, is applicable to all technologies that
provide bene￿ts of E=22, and higher (up to E=25). The subsidy is 13In principle,
you can now decide which technology you like best. However, you cannot simply
go and purchase a speci￿c technology. If you want to buy a technology you will
￿rst have to search for one. This works as follows. In each period you can request
to see an o⁄er for a technology. This technology will be characterized by a certain
level of per￿ period bene￿ts E. To be precise, the computer will draw a number
which determines the technology that is o⁄ered to you. The corresponding purchase
price of this technology (investment cost I) is calculated as described above (see
Figure 1 and/or the second column of Table 2). You are also informed whether the
technology o⁄ered is subsidized, as well as the amount of subsidy associated with
the technology (see the third column of Table 2).
28After having indicated that you wish to search for a new technology, you are
confronted with two buttons. If you press the button labeled ￿ WITH SUBSIDY￿ ,
the computer randomly draws a technology with per￿ period bene￿ts between E=22
and E=25, where each value of E between 22 and 25 is equally likely. You will be
informed about the associated investment costs (I) as well as about the size of the
subsidy (S). If you press the button labeled ￿ WITHOUT SUBSIDY￿ , the computer
randomly draws a technology with per￿ period bene￿ts between E=0 and E=22,
where each value of E between 0 and 22 is equally likely. You will be informed
about the associated investment costs; as these technologies are not subsidized, the
size of the subsidy is zero.
As the technology o⁄ered is random, an o⁄er may be made which is or is not
to your liking. If you do not like the technology o⁄ered, you can decide to continue
your search in the next period. Alternatively, you may like the technology o⁄ered,
but may be uncertain as to whether you want to purchase it now, or in a later period.
That means that in each period in which you are searching for a new technology,
you have to answer two questions. First, whether you prefer the technology to
the technology o⁄ers you (may) have received in earlier periods. Second, whether
you wish to purchase the technology you liked best so far, or whether you want to
postpone this decision.
If you decide to buy the technology the amount I will be subtracted from your
earnings in that period, and an amount E will be added to your earnings in that
period and all future periods. If you decide not to buy the technology (yet), then
there is no e⁄ect on your earnings in that period.
If you decide not to buy the o⁄ered technology, you can request a new o⁄er in
the next period or in any later period. If you do so, you will get a new o⁄er. The
bene￿ts E of the new o⁄er will again be between E = 0 and E = 25 and again you
can request to have an o⁄er for a technology without a subsidy (E randomly drawn
between 0 and 22) or with a subsidy (E randomly drawn between 22 and 25).
You can purchase as many new technologies as you like. However, if you buy a
new technology while you already bought one in an earlier period, then the bene￿ts
E of this new technology will replace the bene￿ts E of the old technology. In other
words, the bene￿ts E do NOT ADD UP if you purchase more than one technology.
A period
As was indicated above in each period you can decide to either set the quantity
you wish to produce or to be informed about a new technology.
29If you decide to be informed about a new technology, you will not be able to
set your quantity and the computer will automatically set your quantity at Q = 0.
That means that you will make zero pro￿ts, independent of the realized value of A
(see also Table 1). On the other hand, if you decide to set your quantity yourself,
you will not get information about a new technology and you will also not be able
to buy a new technology.
Games
As was indicated above, the experiment consists of 5 games. The decision task
in each of these games is exactly the same. Furthermore, the games are completely
independent. This means that the decisions that you take in the present game do
not a⁄ect your pro￿ts in a later game. Your total earnings in a game are:
The pro￿ts you make with your quantity Q in each period
+ the sum of all per￿ period bene￿ts (E) on the technology used in each period
￿the investment costs (I) for each technology that you buy
+ the subsidy (S) you receive on each technology that you buy.
Each game consists of several periods. You do not know how many periods
a game will have. The number of periods for each game is determined as follows.
After each period the computer will determine whether there will be another period.
There is a probability of 90This completes the instructions. However, we will now
also brie￿ y describe the computer screens.
Computer screens
The ￿rst screen of a game is the following.
30In the top￿ left box you can see the game you are in as well as in which period
of that game.
In the middle￿ left box of this screen, you can indicate whether you want to
set the quantity (Q) in this period (by pressing the red button ￿ QUANTITY￿ ), or
to look for a new technology (by pressing the red button ￿ TECHNOLOGY￿ ). If
you press ￿ QUANTITY￿ , you will be informed about the realized value of A in this
period, and you can enter the quantity of output (Q) you wish to produce.
The top￿ right box of the screen becomes active if you choose ￿ TECHNOLOGY￿ .
When pressing ￿ TECHNOLOGY￿ , you will not have the opportunity to set the
quantity of output Q in this period. After having pressed ￿ TECHNOLOGY￿ , the
buttons ￿ WITH SUBSIDY￿and ￿ WITHOUT SUBSIDY￿show up in red. By pressing
￿ WITH SUBSIDY￿ , you will get an o⁄er for technologies that yield per￿ period
bene￿ts of at least 22 points, and a subsidy with a value of 13After pressing either
of the two red buttons, the following screen will appear.
31In the top￿ right box of the screen, you see the characteristics of the technology
that is being o⁄ered in this period. In the bottom￿ right part of the screen, you see
the characteristics of the technology that you preferred until now. Obviously, this
part of the screen only contains zeros if you are searching for the ￿rst time in this
game.
You can now compare the new o⁄er of this period (top right; NEW) to the o⁄er
you liked best until now (bottom right; OLD). Please indicate which of the two
technologies you prefer by clicking the button in front of either the label ￿ NEW￿or
￿ OLD￿ . Next, indicate whether you wish to buy this technology or not (by clicking
on the button YES or NO).
If you click YES, you buy the technology. Its per￿ period bene￿ts (E) are added
to your earnings in this period and in all future periods, the investment costs (I) are
subtracted from your earnings, and the associated subsidy (S, if any) is added to
your earnings. In the next period, this information will be shown in the ￿rst three
lines of the bottom￿ left box of the screen called ￿ Information about technology￿ .
If you click NO, you do not buy the technology, but all relevant information is
retained so that the technology you liked best until now, remains available in the
future in case you wish to buy it later. In the next period, this information will be
32shown in the last three lines of the bottom￿ left box of the screen.
When you have entered your quantity decision or your investment decision, you
proceed to the ￿nal screen of the period:
In this screen, you receive information about your earnings in this period. If
you are ready to continue, please press ￿ OK￿ .
Whether the game proceeds to the next period or ends, is determined by the
computer by means of a random draw. There is a probability of 90If the random
draw is such that the game ends, you will be informed about that, and when pressing
CONTINUE the computer starts the ￿rst period of the next game (unless you have
already played all ￿ve games).
If the random draw is such that the game continues, you will be informed about
that, and the ￿rst screen of the next period appears.
If there are any questions at this point, please raise your hand.
If there are no questions left, we will start the program. You will ￿rst play one
practice game, called game 1, for which you are not being paid. If you have any
questions after having played that practice game, please raise your hand. Otherwise,
33you are free to continue with game 2, which is the ￿rst of the ￿ve games you play
for real money.
34The following table gives your pro￿ts for di⁄erent values of Q and di⁄erent
values of A. The table only lists the pro￿ts for some discrete values of Q and A.
If you wish to ￿nd pro￿ts for intermediate values you can use the formulas in the
text.
Pro￿ts as a function of quantity produced:
Realization of A: Quantity
produced: 1.60 1.65 1.70 1.75 1.80 1.85 1.90 1.95 2.00 2.05 2.10 2.15 2.20 2.25 2.30 2.35 2.40
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 -0.13 0.12 0.37 0.62 0.87 1.12 1.37 1.62 1.87 2.12 2.37 2.62 2.87 3.12 3.37 3.62 3.87
10 -0.53 -0.03 0.47 0.97 1.47 1.97 2.47 2.97 3.47 3.97 4.47 4.97 5.47 5.97 6.47 6.97 7.47
15 -1.20 -0.45 0.30 1.05 1.80 2.55 3.30 4.05 4.80 5.55 6.30 7.05 7.80 8.55 9.30 10.05 10.80
20 -2.13 -1.13 -0.13 0.87 1.87 2.87 3.87 4.87 5.87 6.87 7.87 8.87 9.87 10.87 11.87 12.87 13.87
25 -3.33 -2.08 -0.83 0.42 1.67 2.92 4.17 5.42 6.67 7.92 9.17 10.42 11.67 12.92 14.17 15.42 16.67
30 -4.80 -3.30 -1.80 -0.30 1.20 2.70 4.20 5.70 7.20 8.70 10.20 11.70 13.20 14.70 16.20 17.70 19.20
35 -6.53 -4.78 -3.03 -1.28 0.47 2.22 3.97 5.72 7.47 9.22 10.97 12.72 14.47 16.22 17.97 19.72 21.47
40 -8.53 -6.53 -4.53 -2.53 -0.53 1.47 3.47 5.47 7.47 9.47 11.47 13.47 15.47 17.47 19.47 21.47 23.47
45 -10.80 -8.55 -6.30 -4.05 -1.80 0.45 2.70 4.95 7.20 9.45 11.70 13.95 16.20 18.45 20.70 22.95 25.20
50 -13.33 -10.83 -8.33 -5.83 -3.33 -0.83 1.67 4.17 6.67 9.17 11.67 14.17 16.67 19.17 21.67 24.17 26.67
55 -16.13 -13.38 -10.63 -7.88 -5.13 -2.38 0.37 3.12 5.87 8.62 11.37 14.12 16.87 19.62 22.37 25.12 27.87
60 -19.20 -16.20 -13.20 -10.20 -7.20 -4.20 -1.20 1.80 4.80 7.80 10.80 13.80 16.80 19.80 22.80 25.80 28.80
65 -22.53 -19.28 -16.03 -12.78 -9.53 -6.28 -3.03 0.22 3.47 6.72 9.97 13.22 16.47 19.72 22.97 26.22 29.47
70 -26.13 -22.63 -19.13 -15.63 -12.13 -8.63 -5.13 -1.63 1.87 5.37 8.87 12.37 15.87 19.37 22.87 26.37 29.87
75 -30.00 -26.25 -22.50 -18.75 -15.00 -11.25 -7.50 -3.75 0.00 3.75 7.50 11.25 15.00 18.75 22.50 26.25 30.00
80 -34.13 -30.13 -26.13 -22.13 -18.13 -14.13 -10.13 -6.13 -2.13 1.87 5.87 9.87 13.87 17.87 21.87 25.87 29.87
85 -38.53 -34.28 -30.03 -25.78 -21.53 -17.28 -13.03 -8.78 -4.53 -0.28 3.97 8.22 12.47 16.72 20.97 25.22 29.47
90 -43.20 -38.70 -34.20 -29.70 -25.20 -20.70 -16.20 -11.70 -7.20 -2.70 1.80 6.30 10.80 15.30 19.80 24.30 28.80
95 -48.13 -43.38 -38.63 -33.88 -29.13 -24.38 -19.63 -14.88 -10.13 -5.38 -0.63 4.12 8.87 13.62 18.37 23.12 27.87
100 -53.33 -48.33 -43.33 -38.33 -33.33 -28.33 -23.33 -18.33 -13.33 -8.33 -3.33 1.67 6.67 11.67 16.67 21.67 26.67
Table 1. Quantities and pro￿ts
35The following table gives the relationship between the per￿ period bene￿t (E) a
technology yields and its investment costs (I) for the relevant range of technologies,

































Table 2. Investment costs for the relevant range of technologies
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Figure 5: Average per-period savings by revenue size of the manager￿ s ￿rm
39